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Tort Reform to Ensure the Inclusion of
Fertile Women in Early Phases of
Commercial Drug Research
SUSAN EPSTEIN

The vast majority of prescription and non-prescription drugs are not tested
on women.' The leading analyses of published clinical trials have indicated
that there has been little or no inclusion of women, in particular fertile
women, as subjects in many of the drug studies.' This exclusion would not be
problematic if women and men responded to all drugs in the same way. However, growing medical knowledge indicates that drugs react differently in men's

Susan Epstein is a recent graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. She is the
founder and director of Our Schools, Our Media, a California advocacy organization
dedicated to rebuilding public confidence in public schools.
1. Food and Drug Administration, Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of Gender
Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed Reg 39406 (1993).
There are many groups, in addition to women, that have been excluded from medical research or for whom data has also not been analyzed. The exclusion of these groups
is no more justified scientifically or ethically. Responses to drugs are influenced by many
factors, including age, sex, and ethnic background. See Ruth B. Merkatz, et al, Women in
Clinical Trials of New Drugs: A Cbange in Food and Drug Administration Policy, 329
New Eng J Med 292, 292 (1993). Many of the issues are similar and there is substantial
overlap in the constituencies. Ethnic differences in drug responses are also becoming more
well known. Paul Cotton, Examples Abound of Gaps in Medical Knowledge Because of
Groups Excluded from Scientific Study, 263 JAMA 1051, 1051 (1990) ("Examples
Abound of Gaps"). Only recently have some researchers begun to find pharmacokinetic
explanations for these differences. Id. Gaps remain despite increasing documentation of
these differences and risk profiles among non-whites. Paul Cotton, Is There Still Too Much
Extrapolation From Data on Middle-aged White Men?, 263 JAMA 1049, 1049 (1990)
("Extrapolation"). Some African- and Asian-American researchers are seeking a grant for
a multiethnic research center. Id. Community-based research may be a solution to the
problem of centuries of mistrust of the very institutions that are trying to now recruit
minority subjects. This mistrust was born of historical incidents such as the infamous
Tuskegee Institute experiment conducted in Alabama in the 1930s: scientists deliberately
left syphilis untreated in African-American men. Id at 1050. The elderly comprise another
group whose exclusion from medical research has been discussed frequently in medical
literature in the past decade. Id.
2. 58 Fed Reg at 39406 (cited in note 1).
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and women's bodies; many studies have shown that fertile women in particular
respond differently than men to some drugs. 3 Gender-related differences in
response to drugs can arise from pharmacokinetic differences or pharmacodynamic differences.4 Pharmacokinetic responses refer to the way a drug is
absorbed, excreted, metabolized, or distributed.' Pharmacodynamic responses
are the pharmacologic or clinical reactions to a given concentration of the drug
in blood or other tissue.6
Whether drugs may react differently in men and women can be determined
during early phases of drug testing. Such testing would ensure that drugs are
safe and effective for both sexes. Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers
exclude women from early phases of drug testing, endangering women who
eventually take those drugs.
The goal of this Comment is to demonstrate how litigation can be used to
modify the behavior of pharmaceutical manufacturers, and how the prohibitive
cost of litigation can be reduced for women who have been injured by drugs
not tested on women. Currently, if an injured woman sues a manufacturer for
not testing the drug on women, she must prove both that the drug should
have been tested on women and that the drug caused the injury because it was
not tested on women.7 Because the injured woman presumably does not have
a laboratory or the financial resources to study and prove this causation, her
claim will be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. This Comment
proposes that state courts or state legislatures adopt a rebuttable presumption
that a pharmaceutical defendant's lack of testing is the cause of the woman's
injury-with a correspondingly shifted burden of proof.
Section I of this Comment summarizes the growing medical understanding
of differences in responses to drugs and of the possible harm to women
excluded from clinical trials, particularly early phases of studies. This Section
explains the reasons women have been excluded from clinical trials. Section II
addresses whether those reasons justify exclusion. Section III proposes that
litigation be brought, or threatened, by women who have been injured by
drugs not tested on women. Because the main legal difficulty facing a plaintiff
in such suits is proving the element of causation, this Comment proposes that
courts shift the burden of proof and create a rebuttable presumption that the
defendant manufacturer's drug caused the plaintiff's injury.
In Section IV this Comment will explain why a litigation approach is both
necessary and likely to be effective. Section IV will also discuss circumstances
where such rebuttable presumptions and shifted burdens are appropriate in the
legal system, and why these women's drug product liability suits are appropriate in light of legal, ethical, and scientific policy considerations.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 293 (cited in note 1).
58 Fed Reg at 39409 (cited in note 1).
Id.
Id.
See notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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I. Current Commercial Medical Research Practices
Fertile women have been excluded from medical research, in particular
from early phases of clinical trials, despite growing medical understanding of
differences in the way drugs react in women's and men's bodies!
"[D]ifferences between the sexes in responses to drugs and other interventions
are being reported more frequently."9 "Studies already have found, for example, that some benzodiazepines remain in the bodies of women longer than in
men. Similarly, women metabolize alcohol, ondansetron, lidocaine, aspirin, and
mephobarbital more slowly.""0 This increasing evidence reveals that differences in drug reactions between women and men occur due to variations in body
fat, muscle mass, hormonal conditions, and other factors. 1 "Biologic differences between men and women may reflect genetic, physiologic, lifestyle,
cultural, and social differences-although the mechanisms that explain these
differences are to a great extent unknown."" The FDA is aware of these
studies and of the corresponding need to test drugs on women as well as
men.'" Nevertheless, "[m]any of the largest clinical trials of cardiovascular disease have explicitly excluded women."' 4
Drugs are tested in three phases.'" In phase 1, a scientific screening can
8. James S. Todd (representing the American Medical Association), Letter to the FDA,
Comments on FDA Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the
Clinical Evaluation of Drugs 2 (Nov 19, 1993) ("AMA Response") (on file with The
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable). See also 58 Fed Reg at 39406 (cited in
note 1); Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 292-95 (cited in note 1).
9. J. Claude Bennett, Inclusion of Women in Clinical Trials: Policies for Population
Subgroups, 329 New Eng J Med 288, 289 (1993).
10. AMA Response at 2 (cited in note 8).
11. 58 Fed Reg at 39407 (cited in note 1); Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 293
(cited in note 1).
12. Bennett, 329 New Eng J Med at 289 (cited in note 9).
13. 58 Fed Reg at 39406-07 (cited in note 1).
Concerns about the adequacy of data on the effects of drugs in women have arisen
at a time when the FDA, drug developers, and the scientific community have
focused increasingly on the need to individualize treatment in the face of the wide
variety of demographic, disease-related, and individual patient-related factors that can
lead to different responses to drugs in subsets of the population. Optimal use of
drugs requires identification of those factors so that appropriate adjustments in dose,
concomitant therapy, or monitoring can be made. Subgroup-specific differences in
response can arise because of variation in a drug's pharmacokinetics . . . or
pharmacodynamics....
Id. With regard to pharmacokinetics, the notice stated that "small body size or muscle
mass may lead to higher blood concentrations after a given dose." See also Merkatz, 329
New Eng J Med at 294 (cited in note 1).
14. Bennett, 329 New Eng J Med at 289 (cited in note 9).
15. Phase 1 refers to the first introduction of a new drug into humans, who are often,
but not always, healthy volunteers, to study the basic tolerability of the drug, its metabolism, and its short-term pharmacokinetics. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 293 (cited
in note 1). Phase 1 studies generally involve small numbers of subjects. Id. Phase 1
studies, however, may also provide preliminary pharmacologic information related to
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be performed to determine if women and men may react differently to the
drug being tested. This screening is based on (1) the results of studies of
human subjects conducted in phase 1, and (2) existing data such as animal
studies, toxicology studies, and available scientific knowledge of the substances
in the drugs and their effects in humans. If a potential gender difference exists,
women and men can then both be studied in large numbers during phase 2
and phase 3 to ensure that the drug is safe for both sexes and that the drug
is sold in appropriate dosages and concentrations. This method of screening
for gender-related differences during phase 1 and including women or men in
large numbers during phase 2 and 3 studies, depending on the results of the
phase 1 screen, is recommended by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") in a 1993 guideline.16 Because the FDA guideline is not mandatory,
pharmaceutical companies are not changing their drug testing procedures. 7
Women, and especially fertile women, are still being excluded from drug
testing and particularly from phase 1 testing.18
A.

INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSION OF WOMEN

"[W]omen generally have not been included in phase 1 nontherapeutic
studies or in the earliest controlled effectiveness studies (i.e. early phase 2
studies)."' 9 Paradoxically, a 1977 FDA guideline explicitly required their
exclusion. The guideline stated that, "in general, women of childbearing potential
should be excluded from the earliest studies of a new drug, that is, phase 1 and
2
early phase 2 studies." 1
Even where women are included in phase 3 studies, few analyses of the data
are conducted to detect possible differences in effectiveness or safety between
men and women. 2' "Although women have been included in the later phases of
some clinical trials, inclusion alone is not sufficient for adequate assessment of
22
potential gender differences."
Recently, however, the FDA reformed its policy of exclusion. A 1988 FDA
guideline urged all new drug applications ("NDAs") to analyze gender-related

clinical effectiveness and relative safety. Id. Phase 2 refers to the initial controlled trials of
a drug to study its effectiveness. Before the first such study, there is generally no evidence
that the drug is of therapeutic value in humans. Id. Phase 2 studies normally involve a
few hundred patients. Id. "During Phase 3, the final testing phase before a marketing
application is submitted to the FDA for review, as many as several thousand patients are
studied. These studies provide additional evidence regarding safety and effectiveness, including data on long-term exposure; refine information on dose-response and concentrationresponse relations; and identify relatively rare adverse effects." Id.
16. 58 Fed Reg at 39409-10 (cited in note 1).
17. See text accompanying notes 191-93.
18. See text accompanying notes 194-96.
19. 58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1).
20. Id at 39407.
21. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 294 (cited in note 1).
22. 58 Fed Reg at 39407 (cited in note 1).
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differences.' The "FDA and GAO examined NDAs to see whether analyses of
this kind were being conducted and submitted. Both examinations found that in
many cases (about half) the databases were not being analyzed to determine
whether there were gender, age, or race differences in response to drugs." 24 In
1993 the FDA released a new guideline recommending, but not requiring, that
women be included in phase 1 studies and also be included in large numbers in
later phases when it is scientifically'plausible that women will react differently to
the drug.'
Nonetheless, many pharmaceutical companies have not yet designed trials
tailored to test the relation between gender and drug reactions.2 "Despite the
many examples of documented pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic differences in population subsets, there ... [remains] insufficient attention in the

course of drug development to looking for such differences among individuals in
responses to drugs, including differences related to gender." 27 Also, there has
been little study of the effects of aspects of female physiology, such as the menstrual cycle and menopause, on drug action and pharmacokinetics, even with
respect to drugs widely used by women.28 Use of oral contraceptives, systemic
progestins and estrogens, concomitant oral contraceptive or estrogen use,
differences based on different body fat proportions, and differences in weight or
muscle mass all require more extensive study.29
A striking example of researchers overlooking women occurred in the design
of antidepressants. Although evidence pointed to women having much higher
rates of clinical depression, the initial research on antidepressants was conducted
entirely on men."0 Since these antidepressants have been placed on the market,
evidence has emerged that the need for antidepressants may vary over the course
of a woman's monthly cycle."' These studies suggest that a varied dosage during
32
the month may be more appropriate than a constant dosage.
In addition to the 1977 FDA guideline, there are three major reasons why
women have been excluded: (1) researchers minimize costs by choosing to study
a homogenous group-middle-aged white men; (2) researchers do not want to
injure women subjects or fetuses; and (3) researchers fear litigation by these
women subjects or their children.
Researchers have preferred to study a homogenous group of middle-aged
white men primarily because, in any scientific study, it is best to have few

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id at 39409-11.
26. Id at 39407.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id at 39406-07.
30. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 559 (1.991).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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variables so that you can focus on only those variables you are testing. Gender,
"3
race, socio-economic status, and age are seen as "confounding variables.
Another reason to study a homogenous group is that additional variables are
more expensive and time-consuming; both hurt the bottom line, and pharmaceutical companies must compete in the market. It is less expensive and faster to
study one group. 34 Furthermore, since all people are more alike than not, it is
easier to justify studying just one subgroup.3" Also, if researchers are fairly sure
that there will be no biological differences between men and women with regard
to reactions to a particular drug, they are quick to study just men. 3' The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ("PMA" )37 has recently argued against
including women in all clinical trials.3" Researchers are concerned that stringent
rules on trial design, requiring the inclusion of every imaginable subgroup of
humans, will hinder the release of the drug product. "[A]t some point drug
companies 'just won't bother if the requirements are so expensive.' 39 These
concerns about cost are particularly strong in light of the scientific need to
include large numbers of members of subgroups to detect significant differences
among the subgroups. Even different subgroups of women have different
responses to therapy.40 The final reason to study homogenous groups of middleaged white men is that those designing the studies are overwhelmingly middleaged white men and, perhaps subconsciously, are most concerned with medical
problems they may face themselves. 4

33. Marcia Angell, Caring for Women's Health: What is the Problem?, 329 New Eng
J Med 271, 271 (1993). See also Extrapolation at 1049 (cited in note 1) ("A myopic view
of confounding factors in clinical research is continuing to confound clinical practice.
Efforts to streamline studies by using the most homogenous population possible have filled
medical libraries with data on middle-aged white men. Even female rats are commonly
excluded from basic research.").
34. See Bennett, 329 New Eng J Med at 290 (cited in note 9) ("The high cost and
complexity of large-group trials prohibit their performance except in common diseases.").
35. Jill Wechsler, View from Washington: Women in Clinical Trials, 2 Applied Clinical
Trials 12, 16 (1993).
36. Id.
37. PMA is a trade association representing more than 100 companies engaged in the
research, development, manufacture, and marketing of prescription pharmaceutical and
biological products.
38. John D. Siegfried (representing the PMA), Letter to the FDA, Comments on FDA
Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation
of Drugs 2 (Nov 19, 1993) ("PMA Response") (on file with the University of Chicago
Law School Roundtable) ("The need for larger trials, additional pharmacokinetic studies,
conduct of animal studies earlier, and conduct of animal studies in drugs that ultimately
are not developed, all contribute to higher drug development costs at a time when

Congress and the current Administration are searching for cost containment and reduction
in healthcare spending.").
39. Extrapolation at 1049 (cited in note 1) (quoting FDA spokesman Mike Shaffer).
40. Bennett, 329 New Eng J Med at 290 (cited in note 9).
41. See Extrapolation at 1050 (cited in note 1) ("The notion that white men present
fewer confounding factors is 'an assumption made very glibly, and only because white men
run the country,' says Jerry Avorn, M.D., a geriatrician and associate professor of social
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Whether discrimination is subconscious or not, the conclusion that men are
simpler to study is based on some odd assumptions. For example, a recent article
in a medical journal stated that men have "more readily identifiable cohorts"
with which to compare study results, citing army veterans as an example.42 This
argument is not particularly persuasive-traditional female groups like secretarial
pools, of course, provide similar cohorts.
The second major reason often cited for exclusion of women is that researchers do not want to injure women subjects or fetuses. The original reason that the
FDA's 1977 guideline excluded all women of childbearing potential from clinical
trials was fear of injury to female subjects' reproductive capacities and fear of
injury to any potential fetuses that women subjects might conceive. These remain
concerns of those who argue that fertile women should continue to be exclud43

ed.

A third major reason for exclusion of women is the fear of litigation. A PMA
representative recently stated, "There is always a possibility of pregnancy and
damage to a fetus. In the current legal climate, a fetus would have a legal right
until age 21 against the sponsor."44
When drug companies do include female subjects in their research, they
recruit surgically sterilized women. The fear of possible harm to a potential fetus,
combined with increased political pressure to include women in clinical trials,
seems to have scared many drug companies into testing only surgically sterilized
and post-menopausal women and sometimes only in phase 3.4' In one reported
case, where research was conducted on a drug that would be prescribed only to
fertile women, the pharmaceutical company tested the drug on no fertile wom46

en.

medicine at Harvard University Medical School, Boston, Mass."). See also Janny Scott,
Susan Love: Setting the Agenda for the Politics of Breast Cancer, LA Times M3 (Dec 5,
1993) (Susan Love, a breast cancer activist, recently stated, "I don't think the researchers
are misogynists; I think if you're sitting there with a small pot of money, you will spend
it on what you fear. And if you're a middle-aged white male, it's more likely to go to
heart disease than breast cancer.").
42. Bennett, 329 New Eng J Med at 289 (cited in note 9).
43. Paul Cotton, Women's Health Initiative Leads Way as Research Begins to Fill Gender Gaps, 267 JAMA 469, 470 (1992) (Lionel Edwards, chair of PMA's special populations committee, stated, "A blanket inclusion of women in every study would put them
and their unborn children at unnecessary risk ... "). See also PMA Response at 2 (cited
in note 38).
44. Telephone Interview with John Siegfried, M.D., representative of the PMA (Jan
1994).
45. The PMA released the results of a survey in December 1991; 33 of 46 companies
that the PMA surveyed responded. 76% said they deliberately recruit representative
numbers of women for trials. Cotton, 267 JAMA at 470 (cited in note 43). In a
November 1993 letter, however, a PMA representative wrote, "In circumstances where the
potential risk is greater than the benefit of the information likely to be gained, post-menopausal and surgically-sterilized women can be studied in the earliest trials. Some PMA
sponsors have actively recruited this population for several years to increase women's
participation in early research." PMA Response at 2 (cited in note 38).
46. Joan O'C. Hamilton and Peter Hong, When Medical Research is For Men Only,
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B. HARM TO WOMEN

The harm resulting from women's exclusion is enormous. "Women not only
use more prescription drugs than men but suffer proportionately more adverse
drug reactions, even when controlling for dose and number of drugs prescribed." 47 The FDA's explicit exclusion in its 1977 guideline of women of

childbearing potential from early clinical trials led to a "general lack of participation of women in drug development studies, and thus to a paucity of
information about the effects of drugs in women."" This lack of information
or indefinite information creates extrapolation concerns. Scientists and doctors
are uncertain whether to recommend drugs for women when those drugs have
been tested only on men.49 The doctors may wonder whether the drugs will be
effective and safe for a female patient.5"

Women's exclusion from studies of cardiovascular disease has been particularly tragic. "Heart disease has been the leading killer of American women since

1908.""' Women will comprise nearly half of the 500,000 Americans who die
of heart attacks this year. 2 Nevertheless, until recently, practically no studies on
cardiovascular disease have included women subjects, and even now very few of
these studies include women. 3 As a result of the lack of clinical information
about women and cardiovascular disease, there is "insufficient information about
preventive strategies, diagnostic testing, responses to medical and surgical therapies, and other aspects of cardiovascular illness in women." 4
Exclusion also harms the increasing number of women aware of the inequity
in drug testing and effects, who then fear taking untested drugs and distrust the
medical profession."5 This is dangerous both for women patients and for wom-

3169 Bus Wk 33, 33 (July 16, 1990) ("Restricting a drug's use to half the population is
bad for the bottom line .... Genentech Inc. didn't let reproductive safety concerns short-

circuit research on Relaxin, a hormone that could ease childbirth. Its safety profile is being
analyzed in a group of surgically sterilized women.").

47. Jean Hamilton and Barbara Parry, Sex-Related Differences in Clinical Drug Response: Implications for Women's Health, 38 J Am Med Women's Assn 126, 126 (1983).
48. 58 Fed Reg at 39406 (cited in note 1).
49. Extrapolation at 1049 (cited in note 1); Angell, 329 New Eng J Med at 271 (cited
in note 33).
50. Extrapolation at 1049 (cited in note 1).
51. Jane E. Brody, The Leading Killer of Women: Heart Disease, NY Times C17 (Nov
10, 1993).
52. Id.
53. Vivian W. Pinn, Women's Health Research: Prescribing Change and Addressing the
Issues, 268 JAMA 1921, 1921 (1992).
54. Nanette K. Wenger, Leon Speroff, and Barbara Packard, CardiovascularHealth and
Disease in Women, 329 New Eng J Med 247, 247 (1993).
55. Andrea P. Graham, Introduction, Harv Med Sch Women's Health Watch News 1
(1993) ("If women's bodies responded to medications the way men's do, then we could
feel confident taking drugs tested only on men. But nearly all drug testing (including the
role of estrogen in heart disease!) has been done only on men. If men and women faced
identical risks, then we could safely undergo surgical procedures proven effective only on
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en in the medical profession. The FDA's explicit exclusion of women of childbearing potential from clinical trials in its 1977 guideline "also may have
perpetuated.., a view of the male as the primary focus of medicine and drug
development, with women considered secondarily." 6 For example, fertile
women are often excluded because the menstrual cycle is seen as a confounding
factor 7 but since fertile women are expected to use the drugs, the message
given by the exclusion is that safety is the purpose of drug testing, but only in
regard to men.
Not only are women harmed by drugs never tested on women, but they are
especially harmed by the exclusion of fertile women from .early phases of clinical
trials. During phase 1 the development of the drug is adjusted based on the
subjects' reactions. If women were included in phase 1 studies, drugs would
likely be developed to be more effective and safe for women. "There is reason to
believe that earlier participation of women in studies would increase the likelihood that gender-specific data might be used to make appropriate adjustments
in larger clinical studies (e.g., different doses in women or weight adjusted
dosing... instead of fixed doses).""8
"Although the 1977 guideline has not resulted in [an absolute failure] to
include adequate numbers of women in the later phases of clinical trials, it has
restricted the early accumulation of information about response to drugs in
women that could be utilized in designing phase 2 and 3 trials, and has delayed
appreciation of gender-related variation in drug effects." 9 Another reason that
including women in early phases is more important than their inclusion in later
phases is that differences in the way the drug behaves in women will be clearer;
significant gender differences may appear to be just "noise" in the data from the
larger studies during phase 3.6o
II. Critique of Current Practices
Given the extent of harm women suffer as a result of exclusion from medical
research, the arguments justifying exclusion would have to be extremely compelling. The arguments against including women, however, are far from compelling.
Indeed, many of the researchers' arguments against including women are inaccu-

men. In fact, a recent study showed that women are three times more likely to die following angioplasty than men.").
56. 58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1).
57. Extrapolation at 1049 (cited in note 1).
58. 58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1).
59. Id. Some women's advocates have argued that it is most important to include large
numbers of women in late phase 2 and phase 3 studies to detect any unforeseen adverse
effects in women. Vanessa Merton, for example, has argued that pharmaceutical companies
should be required to include women in later phases of clinical trials because of therapeutic benefits to subjects. Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and
Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) From Biomedical Research 15 (Nov 1993) (unpublished article on file with author).
60. Wechsler, 2 Applied Clinical Trials at 19 (1993) (cited in note 35).
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rate, misguided, and illogical.
The first major reason cited for exclusion-researchers' desire to minimize
costs by studying a homogenous group-is misguided. Pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that in order to keep costs down, they must study one homogenous
group.6 There is no rationale, however, for why it must always be the same
group. There is no scientific reason for middle-aged white men to be the baseline.
The manufacturers are justified in their concern about greatly increased costs
if they have to include every subgroup in large numbers to detect any differences
in drug reaction among subgroups. This Comment, however, is not advocating
that large numbers of women be included in every clinical trial; rather, women
should be included when it is scientifically necessary.6 2
If, as drug manufacturers argue, they must study homogenous groups, then
they should alternate which subgroups are studied. Then, the middle-aged white
men subgroup might only be studied every tenth drug, for instance. Such a system would lead the pharmaceutical companies, which are overwhelmingly run by
middle-aged white men, either to find that the costs of including all the subgroups are not prohibitive or to find a scientific rationale for including large
numbers of members of subgroups when necessary and a demographically
diverse base otherwise.63
Indeed, this Comment argues for including women in equal numbers to men
in phase 1 trials and including women in larger numbers in phase 2 or 3 trials
only when results from phase 1 indicate the need. This system would not be
much more expensive than the current system. The additional cost of developing
drugs might lead to a slightly smaller number of drugs being developed each
year, but those drugs that were developed would be safer and more effective. The
cost to society of less innovation for middle-aged white men is outweighed by the
benefit of better drugs for more of the population.
The second major reason cited for exclusion-researchers do not want to
injure women subjects or fetuses-may be well-intentioned, but it is also very
misguided. For example, this protection rests on the assumption that only
women's behaviors and consumptions can cause birth defects. Medical evidence,
however, demonstrates that sperm can and has contributed to birth defects.
Studies have conclusively shown that sperm can cause adverse reproductive effects, including birth defects.64 The exclusion of fertile women premised on

61. See note 38.
62. The proposed method of including women when it is scientifically necessary may
also apply to other subgroups on whom drugs have typically not been tested, in which
case the costs of drug development would not be unreasonably high; the appropriate
inclusion of other subgroups is beyond the scope of this Comment.
63. This method of inclusion is suggested throughout this Comment. Also, the 1993
FDA guideline recommends including both males and females in drug study groups. 58
Fed Reg at 39406-11 (cited in note 1).
64. Felissa L. Cohen, Paternal Contributions to Birth Defects, 21 Nursing Clinics N
Am 49, 49-51 (1986) (Sperm may contribute to adverse reproductive outcomes including
birth defects. The causes include damage to the sperm or male germ cells or alterations
in the seminal fluid. These may result from paternal exposure to a chemical, drug,
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concerns about harm to potential fetuses is outrageous given the fact that fertile
males are equally capable of causing harm to a fetus.
Most paternal contributions to birth defects occur before conception."
Clearly, a drug company's research could harm a potential fetus through a male
subject. So, if the drug companies' goal in excluding women is to prevent injury
to a fetus, they would also have to confine their subject population to irreversibly sterilized men." Indeed, pharmaceutical companies are currently exposing
themselves to potential liability because the male subjects are never asked to give
informed consent on the basis of possible risk to their future children and are
never asked to avoid conception during the course of the trials.67
Furthermore, harm to fetuses may be eliminated or lessened by precautions
taken against conception while on protocol; the possible harm to a fetus is
outweighed by the definite harm to women created by exclusion from clinical
trials. "[E]xclusion of women from early trials is not medically necessary because
the risk of fetal exposure can be minimized by patient behavior and laboratory
testing." 68 Both the AMA and the FDA have stated that banning women's
participation in early clinical trials is no longer reasonable or legally defensible.69
The PMA, however, does not feel comfortable relying on precautions: "[N]o
matter how well a woman understands the risks, legal liability either as a result
of inadvertent fetal exposure or possibly from an undetected long term adverse
effect on a future pregnancy, remains a very substantial concern." 7' Again, the
PMA's concerns are misguided in that they only feel uncomfortable relying on
precautions with regard to female subjects, when precautions could fail with
male subjects as well, and pharmaceutical companies typically don't even
recommend precautions to their male subjects.
Unless pharmaceutical companies plan to only test surgically sterilized
subjects of either sex, the researchers will need to recommend precautions against
conception to all their subjects of reproductive capacity. These precautions
should include (1) advising all subjects of the risk of potential fetuses being
exposed to toxic agents, (2) recommending the use of contraceptives, and (3)

infectious organism, or other environmental factor. Impaired fertility, infertility, spontaneous
abortion, congenital abnormalities, altered fetal growth, postnatal functional deficits,
prenatal or perinatal fetal death, or carcinogenesis can all be caused by mutations.) See
also Lester F. Soyka and Justin M. Joffee, Male Mediated Drug Effects on Offspring, in
Richard Schwarz and Sumner Yaffe, eds, Drug and Chemical Risks to the Fetus and
Newborn 49 (Liss, 1980) (describing over 30 medical studies showing that male sperm has

contributed or may contribute to birth defects).
65. Cohen, 21 Nursing Clinics N Am at 52 (cited in note 64).
66. Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable,and Once-PregnablePeople at 52 (cited
in note 59).
67. Id at 66-67.
68. 58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1).
69. AMA Response at 2 (cited in note 8); see also Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at
295 (cited in note 1).
70. PMA Response at 2 (cited in note 38).
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providing an informed consent document and an investigator's brochure with
more information on the potential risks. 7 Other precautions include abstinence,
pregnancy testing before and during the trial, and exposure coinciding with or
immediately following menstruation.7 2 Special precautions may be needed where
animal studies have shown a high chance of adverse reproductive outcomes from
the drug.73
These precautions should allow pharmaceutical companies to stop worrying
about harm to fetuses. If a drug company takes all reasonable precautions and
a subject experiences contraceptive failure, conceives, decides to continue the
pregnancy, and gives birth to an affected child, it is unlikely a court would find
the drug company liable. "[T]here is no precedent for imposition of liability for
harm to a subject's children on a researcher who obtained properly informed
consent from the subject."74
The pharmaceutical companies' concern that women subjects might get hurt
because clinical trials entail risks is also illogical. Many more women are likely
to be harmed when untested drugs are on the market than the few women who
voluntarily decide to join a clinical trial.
Researchers have often cited their concern about harming a woman's
reproductive capacity. A woman's reproductive capacity, however, is one of
the main reasons why drugs should be tested on women; women's menstrual
cycles impact the way medications and other therapeutic interventions react in
their bodies.76

71. 58 Fed Reg at 39411 (cited in note 1). Whether informed consent should absolve
the researcher from liability has been debated. Compare Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant,
Pregnable, and Once-PregnablePeople at 105-11 (cited in note 59) (arguing that sponsors
are the cheapest cost avoiders so they owe the subject and should be willing to take on
this liability) with Hayley Gorenberg and Amanda White, Off the Pedestal and Into the
Arena: Toward Including Women in Experimental Protocols, 19 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 205, 229 (1991/1992) (arguing that there should be a public compensation fund
instead of sponsor liability because the public good that results from research outweighs
the individual's harm).
72. 58 Fed Reg at 39411 (cited in note 1).
73.
Where abnormalities of reproductive organs or their function (spermatogenesis or
ovulation) have been observed in experimental animals, the decision to include
patients of reproductive age in a clinical study should be based on a careful riskbenefit evaluation, taking into account the nature of the abnormalities, the dosage
needed to induce them, the consistency of findings in different species, the severity
of the illness being treated, the potential importance of the drug, the availability of
alternative treatment, and the duration of therapy.
Id.
74. Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People at 65 (cited
in note 59).
75. AMA Council, 266 JAMA at 559 (cited in note 30).
76. Id. See also Cotton, 267 JAMA at 470 (cited in note 43) (Irma Mebane, an epidemiologist at the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, said, "The reality . . . is
that much of the research that excludes women in their childbearing years, generally
[women ages] 15 to 44, winds up affecting these same women. We are de facto saying results are generalizable to them without their being involved in the trial."). See also
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In addition, the exclusion of women from clinical trials rests on a paternalistic assumption that a woman cannot make decisions regarding her own health,
safety, and risks.' If researchers are concerned about potential fetuses, the
researchers do not trust that women as parents can make decisions regarding
their children. In addition, researchers assume that if a woman "experiences a
contraceptive failure and conceives, she cannot responsibly and intelligently
weigh the available information and decide whether to continue or terminate the
pregnancy."7 ' The FDA has recognized this paternalism and released its new
guideline hoping to remedy it in the future.79
Thus, the exclusion of women cannot be justified based on concerns about
harms to women or to fetuses. Exposing male subjects to toxic agents may also
harm fetuses. Precautions may be taken to prevent both male and female subjects
from exposing fetuses. Many more women may be injured when they buy
untested drugs than the few who volunteer to join a clinical trial. Finally,
restricting only women from participating in clinical trials betrays a paternalistic
lack of respect for women's autonomy and decision-making capacity. 0
The pharmaceutical companies' third major reason for excluding women-fear of litigation by subjects or their children-is misplaced. First, pharmaceutical companies are as likely to be sued many years later by male subjects'
children as by female subjects' children.8 ' As discussed above, exposing male
subjects to toxic agents may also harm fetuses. And a male. subject's child is
more likely to sue than a female subject's child because a male subject is not
asked to give informed consent based on potential harm to a fetus he later

Extrapolation at 1050 (cited in note 1) (Sidney Wolfe, M.D., of Public Citizens' Health
Research Group in Washington, D.C., has stated, "It makes sense to minimize damage by
making it mandatory to include a proper portion of groups who will use a drug in studies
of that drug.").
77. 58 Fed Reg at 39406 (cited in note 1).
78. Wendy Chavkin and Harold Fox, Letter to the Editor: Ethical Implications of
Rejecting Patients for Clinical Trials, 264 JAMA 973, 973 (1990).
79.
The agency believes that removal of the prohibition on participation of women of
childbearing potential in phase 1 and early phase 2 trials is consistent with congressional efforts to prevent unwarranted discrimination against such women. For
example, in the employment context, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case of [UAW v Johnson Controls,
499 US 187 (1991)], prohibits the blanket exclusion of pregnant women from jobs
they are qualified to perform solely because the working conditions of those jobs
pose potential risks to exposed fetuses. The Court emphasized that "decisions about
the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear,
support, and raise them, rather than to the employers who hire those parents."
While the purposes of clinical trials to develop safe and effective drugs are manifestly different from the purposes of private employment, FDA takes serious note of the
Court's position on a woman's right to participate in decisions about fetal risk and
believes it is appropriate to consider the Court's opinion in developing policy on the
inclusion of women in clinical trials.
58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1).
80. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 295 (cited in note 1).
81. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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conceives, whereas a female subject must provide such informed consent.12
Second, pharmaceutical companies are not likely to be sued for including
women in clinical trials. Lawsuits brought by subjects in clinical trials are very
rare.13 Pharmaceutical companies are particularly concerned about suits brought
by children whose parents were subjects. In most states children may bring a
lawsuit when they reach age 21 if they are adversely affected by the medical
decisions of a parent.8 4 However, if the pharmaceutical company obtains informed consent from the parent, it is unlikely such a suit would succeed."5 So,
pharmaceutical companies will not increase their exposure to liability by including women.
Unfortunately, pharmaceutical companies are correct in their assessment that
they are not likely to be sued for excluding women. Currently, if an injured
woman sues a manufacturer for not testing the drug on women, she must prove
that the drug should have been tested on women and that the drug caused the
injury because it was not tested on women.8 ' Since the injured woman does not
have a laboratory and the financial resources to study and prove this causation,
her claim will be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. This Comment
therefore proposes shifting the burden of causation so that injured women may
succeed in suing pharmaceutical companies. With the shifted burden, the risk of
liability will be much higher for excluding women than for including women.
III. Proposed Litigation Model
A. LITIGATION GOAL: APPROPRIATE INCLUSION
Fertile women should be included in early phases of drug trials and, in some
circumstances, in large numbers in later phases. The pharmaceutical manufacturers are justified in their concern for harm to fetuses; potential injury can,
however, be prevented for the most part through the precautions described
above, if the precautions are taken for both male and female subjects. The
manufacturers are also justified in their concern about greatly increased costs if
they are to include every subgroup in large numbers to detect any differences in
drug reaction among subgroups. When deciding whether representatives of
subgroups must be included, there are scientific, economic, and ethical considerations.
Phase 1 subjects must be demographically representative (e.g. of gender, race,
age, etc.) of the targeted market so that they each can have a reasonable impact
on the early study. Such a subject pool is only marginally more expensive than

82. Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People at 65 (cited
in note 59).
83. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 295 (cited in note 1).
84. Id.
85. Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People at 65 (cited

in note 59).
86. See notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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an all middle-aged white male pool (the additional costs are due to recruiting
different kinds of people with different needs). The- decision whether to include
large numbers of members of any of the subgroups in later phases should be
based on the results of the phase 1 study and on any other existing data, such as
animal studies, toxicology studies, and available scientific knowledge of the
substances in the drug and their effects in humans.8 7 Subgroup, in this context,
means any group for which a hypothesis exists that it is biologically plausible for
it to be affected differently by the drug being studied. For example, there may be
times when women using oral contraceptives or estrogen replacement should be
included in large numbers so that differences in responses between them and
patients not on such therapy can be examined."
This Comment's proposed method for determining whom to include during
each phase is essentially the same as the system urged in the FDA's new guideline. 9 Commercial drug manufacturers, however, have not yet used this method
of inclusion, and this Comment therefore advocates increasing the likelihood of
liability due to exclusion.
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY SUITS' °
Although tort law varies by state, I have categorized three kinds of suits that
can be adapted to any state's laws: suits alleging failure to provide safe products,

87. For similar recommendations, see Angell, 329 New Eng J Med at 272 (cited in
note 33). See also Wenger, Speroff, and Packard, 329 New Eng J Med at 252 (cited in
note 54).
88. 58 Fed Reg at 39410 (cited in note 1). There is less of a consensus on whether
currently pregnant women should be included. The AMA and the FDA plan to explore
this issue further and have not released any clear positions as yet. AMA Response at 2
(cited in note 8). One of the arguments for including men and women of reproductive
capacity in clinical trials is that precautions can be taken against their conception. Clearly,
no precautions against conception are available for pregnant women. However, drugs are
often prescribed to pregnant women. See Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 295 (cited in
note 1) ("[M]any drugs are ultimately used during pregnancy without reliable data on
their maternal and fetal effects."). Some have argued that this is a case where postmarketing data needs to be better collected, rather than collecting data prior to marketing.
Id. I disagree; the argument that it is better to test a drug on a few subjects than harm
many people on the market applies equally to pregnant women. The solution to this
problem is to be even more comprehensive in the informed consent and clinical design
protocol when pregnant women are included for the study of drugs for use during
pregnancy, but not to exclude pregnant women from studies.
89. See 58 Fed Reg at 39406-11 (cited in note 1).
90. Other kinds of lawsuits have been proposed. One very promising legal claim is a
suit against an institutional review board ("IRB") or the FDA, since these are both in the
position of approving test protocols. See Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and
Once-Pregnable People at 88-90 (cited in note 59). An equal protection suit brought
against the FDA for its explicit policy of excluding women, which has been proposed, is
no longer useful due to the new FDA guideline. See L. Elizabeth Bowles, The
Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and
Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 Vand L Rev 877, 901-07 (1992).
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failure to test, or failure to warn. The principles described in all three should be
applicable to some extent in each state.
An issue raised in many drug product liability suits is whether FDA approval
preempts state tort law. In general, FDA approval of a drug for marketing does
not exempt the manufacturer from liability for damage caused by the drug after
marketing."' The majority of states have held that compliance with FDA standards is insufficient to immunize the drug manufacturer from state tort claims. 2
So, a jury may find that a manufacturer was unreasonably dangerous or negligent even if the drug complied with FDA minimum requirements. 3 Since the
goal of both the FDA regulations and state tort law is to provide the consumer
with safe and effective pharmaceutical products, most courts view state tort actions as increasing the incentive for drug manufacturers to improve the quality
and safety of their products. 4
The standard of liability in drug product liability suits also varies by state.
Most states have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A, requiring
strict liability for pharmaceutical products." These states sometimes mitigate
this rule by using Comment k, which protects manufacturers from strict liability
on the basis that some products are unavoidably unsafe." But many of these
states find that Comment k is not always applicable to drug manufacturers
because not all drugs are unavoidably unsafe. 7 Other states use a negligence
91. Abbot v American Cyanamid Co., 844 F2d 1108, 1112-13 (4th Cir 1988) (holding
that FDA approval did not preempt Virginia common law liability); Mazur v Merck &
Co., 742 F Supp 239, 247 (E D Pa 1990) (holding that compliance with FDA regulation
does not absolve the manufacturer of liability); Hurley v Lederle Lab., 851 F2d 1536,
1539-40 (5th Cir 1988) (holding that FDA approval of drug labeling does not preempt
state law); Graham v Wyeth Lab., 666 F Supp 1483, 1493 (D Kan 1987) (holding that
"[w]hile Congress intends vaccines to be at least as uniformly safe as the FDA regulations
require, there has never been a congressional intent that innocent victims of adverse
reactions should be precluded from being compensated"); Feldman v Lederle Lab., 97 NJ
429, 479 A2d 374, 391 (1984) (holding that regulation by the FDA will not insulate drug
manufacturers from liability under state law).
92. Salmon v Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir 1975) (holding that
compliance with FDA regulations, while pertinent, does not in itself absolve a manufacturer of liability); MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass 131, 475
NE2d 65, 70-71 (1985) (holding that compliance with the FDA standards was not a
shield against state tort liability). But see Grundberg v Upjohn Co., 813 P2d 89, 95 (Utah
1991) (holding that FDA approved prescription drugs are unavoidably dangerous in design,
therefore manufacturers are immune from strict liability).
93. Malek v Lederle Lab., 125 Il App 3d 870, 466 NE2d 1038, 1039-40 (1984)
(holding that a jury may consider compliance with FDA regulations in determining reasonableness, but that compliance is not conclusive).
94. Graham, 666 F Supp at 1493. But see Frederick H. Fern and Lewis Bartell, Federal Preemption of Pharmaceutical Labeling, For the Defense 20 (July 1987) ("The courts

should defer to FDA's expertise in the field, and give controlling weight to FDA's
approval of a drug's labeling.").
95. Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A (1965); Feldman, 479 A2d at 380.
96. Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A, Comment k (1965); Feldman, 479 A2d at
381-82; Brown v Sup Ct, 44 Cal3d 1049, 751 P2d 470, 477 (1988).
97. Feldman, 479 A2d at 383; Hill v Searle Lab., 884 F2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir
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standard for pharmaceutical products."8
1. Failure to provide safe products.
In those states that have adopted Section 402A, a woman injured by a drug
could bring a failure to provide safe products suit against a pharmaceutical
manufacturer. These suits create incentives to better design drugs. Especially
where the alleged defect is that the drugs are not safe for women, the incentive
is to design drugs that are safe or safer for women, and this means better testing.
To achieve this impact, the suit must be brought by a plaintiff, injured
because a drug she took was not safe for women, against a manufacturer who
could have reasonably prevented the plaintiff's injuries by (1) testing the drug on
women, (2) learning through testing that (a) it is impossible to create such a drug
that is safe for women, or (b) there is a more effective drug for women or a
more effective dosage for women, and/or (3) by labeling the drug accordingly.
A drug manufacturer has a duty to distribute a product that is fit for its
intended purpose." A seller of any product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" is subject to liability for physical harm
to the user if the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product and the
product has reached the user without substantial change in its condition when
sold.10' Liability may attach even if the seller exercises "all possible care" in
preparation of the product and despite the absence of any contractual connection
between the user and the seller.1"' The focus is not on whether the manufacturer or seller was at fault, but on whether the product itself was flawed. "[Tlhe
10 2
design must be as safe as the best available testing and research permits."
One rationale for holding manufacturers and sellers of defective products
strictly liable without regard to privity, foreseeability, or due care, is that they
are able to distribute costs among all of the customers who benefit from the
product. 3 "Where experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public,
nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical knowl-

1989); Toner v Lederle Lab., 779 F2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir 1986); but see McElhaney v
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F Supp 228, 230-31 (D SD 1983), aff'd, 739 F2d 340 (8th Cir
1984) (holding that Comment k applies to all prescription drugs).
98. Baldino v Castagna, 308 Pa Super 506, 454 A2d 1012, 1020 (1982) (stating that
compliance with FDA regulation does not establish that actor exercised reasonable care

and that jury could find defendant pharmaceutical company negligent).
99. Feldman, 479 A2d at 385.
100. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
101. Id.
102. Toner v Lederle Lab., 112 Idaho 328, 732 P2d 297, 306 (1987), aff'd, 828 F2d
510 (9th Cir 1987).
103. Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 612 (Little Brown, 5th ed 1990)
(The drafters of the Restatement decided on absolute liability because of the role of
manufacturers: "their market power, their capacity to obtain insurance, and their ability
to internalize the costs of accidents associated with their products.").
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edge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers."" 4
Under a strict liability standard, once the plaintiff proves that the injury was
caused by the defect, the manufacturer bears the burden of proving that its
actions in marketing the drug were reasonable in light of the expert knowledge
in the field.' Also, if the manufacturer's defense is that it could not know of
the defect, it bears the burden of proving that it was unable to discover the
defect.0 6
If the state mitigates Section 402A with Comment k, the plaintiff would have
to argue that the drug is not unavoidably unsafe because the manufacturer could
have avoided the injury either by testing on women or by labeling the drug. The
inquiry whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe is essentially the same as whether
a manufacturer was negligent.'0 7 Discussions of two kinds of negligence suits
follow.
2. Failure to test.
Drug companies have been found liable for inadequate research.'
This
principle can be extended and applied to failure to conduct research on women,
including fertile women and even pregnant women, that would have revealed the
specific risks which ultimately appeared in the female population when the drug
was approved and sold. The incentive created by failure to test suits is better
tests. Particularly where the alleged failure is the failure to test women subjects,
the suit creates an incentive to test drugs on women.
The suit requires a plaintiff to claim that her injuries were caused by a drug
she took that was not tested on women.0 9 Had the drug been so tested, the
manufacturer would have known of its side-effects, and therefore the manufacturer would have warned the patient's physician of the possible or likely injury
to her as a woman taking the drug, and with that warning she would not have
taken the drug.
When the defect consists of an improper design, the reasonableness of the
manufacturer in marketing the product is a factor in determining liability."0
"A manufacturer's duty of reasonable care includes a duty of product inspection
and testing ... as is reasonably necessary to render the product safe for its users."' " If the drug in the suit is one which the manufacturer foresaw would be
sold to women, the manufacturer should have considered the effects of the drug
on women. Based on toxicology studies and other scientific data, the manufacturer should have decided whether it needed to include large numbers of women

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
(1984).

Dalehite v United States, 346" US 15, 52 (1953) (Jackson dissenting).
Feldman, 479 A2d at 385.
Id at 388.
Graham, 666 F Supp at 1498; Feldman, 479 A2d at 385-86.
See, for example, Taylor v Wyeth Lab., 139 Mich App 389, 362 NW2d 293, 296

109. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984).
110. Id; Feldman, 479 A2d at 385-86.
111. Taylor, 362 NW2d at 296.
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or a particular subgroup of women in its clinical trials."' Any drug that will be
sold to women should include women in its phase 1 trials, or else the manufacturer will not know whether or not the drug will hurt women."' Liability may
attach when the manufacturer knew of the defect in the product and did not act
in a reasonably prudent manner in marketing the product."' This principle can
be applied where the defect is that the drug was not tested on women and the
drug is then marketed to both men and women.
The duty to test is supported by federal law and FDA regulations that
require a New Drug Application ("NDA") to demonstrate "adequate and wellcontrolled investigations, including clinical investigations... "I1' and to include "data demonstrating substantial evidence of effectiveness for the claimed
indications."" 6 The court in Toole v Richardson used Section 355(b) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to hold that the adequacy of tests of
MER/29 "is strictly for the determination of the [FDA]."" 7 The defendant was
found liable for failing to pursue abnormalities in test animals."'
The FDA regulations further state that "[e]vidence is also required to
support the dosage and administration section of the labeling.., and modifications for specific subgroups (for example, pediatrics, geriatrics, [and] patients
with renal failure)."" 9 "If evidence is available to support the safety and
effectiveness of the drug only in selected subgroups of the larger population with
the available evidence and state the
a disease ... the labeling shall describe
20
drug."
the
of
usefulness
of
limitations
In interpreting what adequate testing means under these statutes, the courts
assume that pharmaceutical companies have all the information of experts in the
field.12 ' Manufacturers are under a duty to keep abreast of current developments, and knowledge of such developments is imputed to them.'" There is a
scientific consensus on gender-related differences both in effectiveness of drugs
and side-effects of drugs. The FDA and AMA have both released statements
acknowledging that these differences exist and must be pursued in clinical
tests. 3 The leading national medical journals have published articles with

112. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text for a proposed system for deciding which
subjects to include. See also the 1993 FDA guideline, recommending the same system. 58
Fed Reg at 39406-11 (cited in note 1).
113. 58 Fed Reg at 39410 (cited in note 1).
114. Barson, 682 P2d at 835.
115. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC S 355(d) (1988).

116. 21 CFR S 314.50 (d)(5)(v) (1995).
117. Toole v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal App 2d 689, 60 Cal Rptr 398, 410
(1967).
118. Id at 413.
119. 21 CFR S 314.50 (d)(5)(v) (1995).

120. 21 CFR S 201.57(c)(3)(i) (1995).
121. Feldman, 479 A2d at 386-87.
122. Barson, 682 P2d at 835.
123. 58 Fed Reg at 39406-11 (cited in note 1); AMA Council, 266 JAMA at 559-62
(cited in note 30); AMA Response (cited in note 8).
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similar conclusions. 24 Passages from the FDA guideline demonstrate the clear,
expected standard.'
Therefore, the experts are in agreement that it is not
unavoidable that a drug was not tested on women. Clearly, the PMA has read
the FDA guideline, which explicitly states what is appropriate."6 No
pharmaceutical company can successfully claim that it does not know about the
new FDA guideline or the consensus in the field.
Courts have engaged in quite close scrutiny of the research design of clinical
trials and criticized them for their lack of relevance to actual market conditions.'27 In general, "[t]esting procedures should simulate as closely as possible
the anticipated conditions of marketing and use of the product."' If a product
is intended for long-term use, testing it in short-term trials which fail to detect a
side effect may subject a manufacturer to liability." 9
This Comment has discussed how a pharmaceutical company should decide
how many women must be included in clinical trials. 3 Similarly, "[t]he [FDA]
guidelines urge that reasonable numbers of women be included in studies of new
drugs. 'Reasonable numbers' are not defined precisely; rather, the agency expects
enough representation of both sexes so that significant differences can be
detected." 3 '
Indications of a disparate occurrence of an adverse effect in one particular
subpopulation of foreseeable users has been held sufficient to trigger an obligation to conduct further research "reasonably necessary to render the product safe
for its users."' ' 3 Courts penalize companies that do not conduct reasonable
testing to determine the potential adverse reactions of their products, even if the
testing involved was not required by the FDA.'33 The reason most courts give

124. See, for example, Cotton, 267 JAMA at 469-73 (cited in note 43); Bennett, 329
New Eng J Med at 288-91 (cited in note 9); Pinn, 268 JAMA at 1921-22 (cited in note
53).
125. See, for example, 58 Fed Reg at 39410-11 (cited in note 1).
The patients included in clinical studies should, in general, reflect the population
that will receive the drug when it is marketed. For most drugs, therefore, representatives of both genders should be included in clinical trials in numbers adequate to
allow detection of clinically significant gender-related differences in drug response. . . . [I]t is prudent to at least carry out pilot studies to look for major
pharmacokinetic differences before conducting definitive controlled trials, so that
differences that might lead to the need for different dosing regimens can be detected.
Id.
126. See PMA Response (cited in note 38).
127. Tinnerbolm v Parke Davis, 285 F Supp 432, 446-48 (S D NY 1968), modified
and aff'd, 411 F2d 48 (2d Cir 1969) (upholding negligence claim of child injured by
vaccine that was "rush[ed] to commercialization" without testing under market conditions).
128. Marden G. Dixon and Frank Woodside, Drug Product Liability, S 14.04(2) at 1468 (M. Bender, 1990).
129. Hoffman v Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F2d 132, 140-41 (3d Cir 1973).
130. See text accompanying notes 87-89.
131. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 294 (cited in note 1).
132. Taylor, 362 NW2d at 296-97.
133. Barson, 682 P2d at 836 (manufacturer negligent for not testing for teratogenic
effects of injected progestational hormone); West v Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174
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for not holding that FDA regulations preempt state law is that the FDA regulations are a minimum requirement. Here, there is an FDA guideline expressing,
though not requiring, the standard for including women in clinical trials. So, it
would be easy for a state court to find that its tort laws require the manufacturer
to meet that standard.
Product liability law generally imposes a duty on a manufacturer to directly
warn foreseeable users of any known dangers associated with the use of a
product.1 34 However, in most jurisdictions, a manufacturer of prescription
drugs can discharge this duty either by warning the consumer directly, or by
warning a "learned intermediary," traditionally the treating or prescribing
physician. 3 '
Of the relatively few tort complaints that have attempted to hold drug
companies responsible for harm on a theory of insufficient research, most focus
their pleadings on the manufacturer's failure to warn of risks that it would have
known about, had proper clinical research been conducted, rather than on a
failure to test per se. That is, the manufacturer lacks information that could and
should have been transmitted to the consumer, or with prescription drugs, to the
prescribing physician, because it failed to conduct the research that would have
developed that information.
3. Failure to warn.
Drug companies have been found liable for not warning consumers of a
danger of a drug. 136 This principle can be extended and applied to failure to
warn that no research was conducted on the effects of a drug in women.
The incentive created by failure to warn suits is better labeling for the
consumer or greater notice of the extent of clinical testing to doctors. The impact
of this suit, therefore, is not as great as the above two kinds of suits which might
lead directly to improved testing. Labels (or notice to doctors) indicating that a
drug was not tested on women, or not tested on women with reproductive
capacity, would not make the drug any safer for women who will most likely
need to take the drug regardless of this label (or notice). Labels could, however,
have a political impact if they caused large numbers of women to become aware
that drugs are not being tested on them. Notice to doctors could have an impact
if doctors became frustrated by repetitive off-label prescriptions. Also, labels
could have an impact if some drug companies test on women and their drugs'
labels state that they are safe for women, and other drugs' labels say they have
not been tested on women. Then, the companies that test on women will benefit

Cal App 3d 831, 220 Cal Rptr 437, 448 (1985) (tampon manufacturer liable for failing
to test for vaginal infections and failing to include in studies women with a history of
vaginitis).
134. Frederick H. Fern, The Decline and Fall of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, For
the Defense 10 (Sept 1986).
135. Id.
136. See, for example, Barson v E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P2d 832, 835 (Utah
1984) (failure to warn of a known danger is negligent per se).
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economically, and other companies will follow suit.
A failure to warn suit requires a plaintiff who was injured because a drug
she took did not have a label indicating it was not tested on women (or her
doctor was given no notice). The plaintiff must further be able to show that, had
there been such a label (or notice), she would not have taken the drug. The legal
claim is that such a label is reasonable and it is foreseeable that the lack of
warning would have this effect.
"'[L]iability may attach if the manufacturer [did] not take available and
reasonable steps to lessen or eliminate the danger of even a significantly useful
and desirable product.' 1 37 When the risk is not apparent, consumers must be
warned of concealed dangers in an adequate and comprehensible way.1 38 As
stated above, with pharmaceutical products, the manufacturer's duty to warn
may be discharged by warnings to the physician or to the patient. 3 9 Failure to
warn of known dangers may be considered either negligence or a kind of defect
in the product marketed. If the injured party can also prove that the warning
would have prevented the injury and thus that the failure to warn caused the
injury, damages may be recoverable from the seller of the product. 4 °
The manufacturer's failure to warn of a danger in a drug that the manufacturer knew or should have known about subjects the manufacturer to liabili"
ty. 41
' In Barson v E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. the court held that failure to warn
of a known danger is negligent per se and subjects the manufacturer to direct
liability whether knowledge was constructive or actual.' 42
The standard for adequate warnings is based in both common law and
federal regulation. The warnings must be accurate in content and conveyed
through an appropriate means and style of communication. 4 The duty to
warn is limited to those risks which were reasonably foreseeable at the time the
drug was prescribed and used. If the seller realizes, however, that its knowledge
of potential adverse effects is limited, it should at least warn the consumer that
the product is experimental and may present unknown hazards.' 44 A drug
package insert represents an agreement between the manufacturer and the
FDA. 4' Many drugs are not tested on enough of a certain population, so the
insert says, "Not recommended for such and such population" or "Not tested on

137. Brochu v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F2d 652, 655 (1st Cir 1981) citing

Thibault v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 NH 802, 395 A2d 843, 846 (1978).
138. Brochu, 642 F2d at 656.
139. Grundberg v Upjohn Co., 813 P2d 89, 97 (Utah 1991); Basko v Sterling Drug

Co., 416 F2d 417, 426 (2d Cir 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v Cornish, 370 F2d 82, 85
(8th Cir 1966).
140. Ezagui v Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F2d 727, 736 (2d Cir 1979).
141. Hasler v United States, 517 F Supp 1262, 1268 (E D Mich 1981).

142. Barson, 682 P2d at 835.
143. Sterling Drug Inc. v Yarrow, 408 F2d 978, 992 (8th Cir 1969) (unreasonable to
fail to instruct "detail men" who regularly saw prescribing physicians to warn the
physicians about drug risks).
144. Singer v Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir 1972).

145. See 21 CFR 5 201.57(c)(3)(i) (1995).
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they prescribe "off-lasuch and such population."'1 6 Doctors are liable when
14 7
patient.
the
to
warning
sufficient
give
bel" unless they
For the plaintiff, the hardest part of the failure to warn suit is proving
causation. To be liable for a failure to warn, the injured individual must 4show
that she would not have used the drug had a proper warning been given.' 1
C. PROVING CAUSATION (AVOIDINGA NONSUlT FOR LACK OF INFORMATION
ON CAUSATION)

For the above tort suits, the plaintiff may have difficulty proving the causal
link between the drug and the event necessary for legal action. While the manufacturer has the resources and the interest to conduct research on its product, a
plaintiff is unlikely to have the resources to hire an expert to conduct research on
the product. The company is unlikely to invest in epidemiological or controlled
studies that may reveal a genuine systematic problem if it believes it can instead
dismiss whatever evidence emerges on the market as "anecdotal" or "meaningless coincidental clusters." This creates somewhat of a Catch-22 situation. If the
manufacturer does not test on women, there is no evidence that the manufacturer
should have tested on women because there is no evidence of how the drug
reacts in women.
1. Traditional procedural steps for proving causation.
There are two levels of proof for causation in toxic tort suits: general
causation and specific causation. To prove general causation the plaintiff must
show that the drug in question is capable of causing the alleged injury. This
proof may consist of animal studies (where animals are given huge doses of the
drug) or toxicology studies (that look at whether the active ingredients in the
drug, not the inert ingredients, could cause the effect or injury).' 49 Recently, the
Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. rejected the
requirement that scientific evidence be generally accepted as valid in the scientific
community before being admissible in court.' 50 In effect, this holding removed
the requirement of epidemiological proof. Epidemiological studies involve a large
number of humans and statistical analyses; they are very expensive.' The
Court in Daubert stated that, instead, admissible proof may consist of a hypothe-

146. Telephone Interview with Joseph W. Cranston, M.D., Director of the Department
of Drugs at the AMA (Nov 1993) (There are many off-label uses, including 80% of
pediatric prescriptions and 50% of cancer prescriptions.).
147. Id.

148. MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass 131, 475 NE2d 65, 72
(1985); Mazur v Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F Supp 239, 262 (E D Pa 1990).

149. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence after
Daubert, 55 U Pitt L Rev 889, 899-900 (1994).

150. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,113 S Ct 2786, 2792-94 (1993).
151. Telephone Interview with researchers at multiple laboratories in Chicago, Illinois
(Nov 1993).
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sis of causation made by the scientific community."'
To prove specific causation, the plaintiff must show that the drug in fact
caused the plaintiff's injury and that the defendant pharmaceutical company in
fact made the drug taken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also demonstrate,
through adequate studies, a relationship between the exposure and her injuries.
Courts can and should scrutinize these studies, making the burden of proof
15 3
difficult to meet.
For the kinds of drug product liability suits discussed in this Comment,
general causation is likely to be hard to prove due to the Catch-22 situation
described above. The standard of proof may vary by state and by legal claim.
For example, a Michigan court held, "[Tihis issue is one for the jury, provided
there is evidence from which reasonable persons could draw a 'fair inference'
that the injury was caused by the negligent omission."" 4
Possibly, a plaintiff could succeed in proving causation by hiring an expert
witness to run a study or to state an obvious hypothesis that women should have
been studied (based on existing animal studies, toxicology studies, or other
existing scientific knowledge). But there might be a statute of limitations problem
with the expert conducting a study because studies can take a long time, and the
study might be too expensive for plaintiff's counsel.
It is unreasonable for the legal system to expect a plaintiff to hire an expert
to run a study when the defendant manufacturer is obviously the party responsible for doing so in the first place. It is reasonable for the legal system to expect
a plaintiff to hire an expert to dispute the manufacturer's choice not to study
large numbers of women or a subgroup of women. For example, in West v
Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. the plaintiff's experts asserted "(1) that
adequate testing would have revealed an association between tampon use and
vaginal infection, and ultimately between such use and menstrually-related TSS
[toxic shock syndrome]; (2) that JJP's [Johnson & Johnson's] testing was
inadequate; (3) that JJP's decision not to do any further testing ... was a
conscious one; and (4) therefore, JJP acted in conscious disregard of the safety of
others." 55 The California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District upheld the
jury decision that the defendant was negligent."5 6

152. Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2794.
153. Clifton T. Hutchinson and Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony,
15 Cardozo L Rev 1875, 1926 (1994).
154. Taylor v Wyeth Lab., 139 Mich App 389, 362 NW2d 293, 297 (1984) (holding
that medical research articles submitted into evidence by plaintiff were sufficient evidence
of what the results of tests might have been).
155. West v Jobnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174 Cal App 3d 831, 220 Cal Rptr
437, 460 (1985).

156. Id.
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2. Tort law reform: shift the burden of production and create a rebuttable
presumption that defendants' lack of testing is the cause.
In order to provide the proper incentives to manufacturers and to be fair to
plaintiffs, courts may need to shift the burden of production on the issue of
general causation and create a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's lack
of testing is the cause of the injury. In all states besides California, this may
require a statute passed by the legislature. In California, the courts have allowed
such burden shiftings and presumptions without legislative statutes.' s7
a) Legal rationalefor shifting the burden. In Haft v Lone Palm Hotel the

California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs met the initial burden of proof
on the issue of causation by showing that the defendants violated a statute
requiring either a lifeguard at their pool or a sign indicating that there is no
lifeguard.' The burden then shifted to the defendants to show that this violation was not a proximate cause of the deaths." 9 If the defendants could not
prove the violation was not the proximate cause, then causation would be presumed.' 60
Similarly, a woman could show that a pharmaceutical manufacturer did not
test on women, which violates the FDA regulation of adequate testing for all
NDAs."' The burden would then shift to the manufacturer to show that this
violation was not a proximate cause of the injury the woman suffered. If the
manufacturer failed to show that its refusal to test on women was not the
proximate cause of her injury, the manufacturer's inadequate testing would be
the presumed cause. To rebut the presumption, the manufacturer could argue
that it would not have been reasonable to test on women, or that it is scientifically impossible for the drug to cause the injury the plaintiff has suffered.
The Haft court's decision to shift the burden was based on the difficulty the
plaintiff faced in attempting to show causation.'62 The court held that where

157. See, for example, Haft v Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal 3d 756, 478 P2d 465, 470
(1970)
158.
159.
160.
161.

(en banc).
Haft, 478 P2d at 470.
Id.
Id at 473.
See text accompanying notes 115-20.

162.
The troublesome problems concerning the causation issue in the instant case of
course arise out of the total lack of direct evidence as to the precise manner in
which the drownings occurred. Although the paucity of evidence on causation is
normally one of the burdens that must be shouldered by a plaintiff in proving his
case, the evidentiary void in the instant action results primarily from defendants'
failure to provide a lifeguard to observe occurrences within the pool area ....
The
absence of such a lifeguard . . . not only . . . [increased plaintiffs' risk of harm],
but also deprived the present plaintiffs of a means of definitively establishing the
facts leading to the drownings. Clearly, the failure to provide a lifeguard greatly
enhanced the chances of the occurrence of the instant drownings ....
[P]laintiffs
have gone as far as they possibly can under the circumstances in proving the
requisite causal link between defendants' negligence and the accidents. To require
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the defendant's negligence makes it impossible, as a practical matter, for the
plaintiff to prove "proximate causation" conclusively, it is more appropriate to
hold the defendant liable than to deny an innocent plaintiff recovery, unless the
defendant can prove that his negligence was not a cause of the injury.'63
Similarly, in Summers v Tice, the court held that the impossibility of the
plaintiff's task in determining which of two defendants had caused his injury
required the burden of proof to shift to the defendants as a matter of fairness
and in view of the parties' relative fault.'64 The court stated that the practical
difficulties facing the plaintiff bore considerable similarity to the problems the
court addressed earlier in Ybarra v Spangard."s
In Ybarra the plaintiff confronted the formidable task of proving which of
the doctors and attendants who participated in his operation while he was
unconscious were responsible for his injury. The court held that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff could maintain his claim against all the
persons who had a connection with the operation, and the burden was placed on
the individual defendants to demonstrate their non-involvement." 6 "[The]
plaintiff has made out a case when he has produced evidence which gives rise to
an inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury. It is up
to the defendants to explain the cause of the injury."" 7
An injured female plaintiff brought a suit in 1985 which argued for such a
shift in the burden and for such a presumption."' The plaintiff in Jones v
Ortho tried to hold the manufacturer liable for its failure to conduct clinical trials that could have established whether its product contributed to her cancer.
Her legal theory relied on a since-revised section of FDA regulations that stated
that new drug applications must provide "adequate information" consisting of
reports of "an adequate number of subjects, designed to record observations and
permit evaluation of any and all discernible effects attributable to the
drug.... " 9 Her argument was that the company's failure to investigate this
potential risk made it impossible for her to establish the causal link that would
sustain her underlying claim for the cancer, and that therefore the burden to
demonstrate the causal connection between the drug and her cancer should be

plaintiffs to establish 'proximate causation' to a greater certainty than they
have . . . would permit defendants to gain the advantage of the lack of proof
inherent in the lifeguardless situation which they have created. Under these circumstances the burden of proof on the issue of causation should be shifted to defendants to absolve themselves if they can.
Haft, 478 P2d at 474-75 (citations omitted).

163. Id at 476.
164. Summers v Tice, 33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P2d 1, 4 (1948) (en banc).
165. Ybarra v Spangard, 25 Cal 2d 486, 154 P2d 687, 688 (1944) (during surgery on
plaintiff's appendix, plaintiff's arm was accidentally injured).
166. Ybarra, 154 P2d at 689-90.
167. Summers, 199 P2d at 4 (discussing Ybarra).
168. Jones v Ortbo Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal App 3d 396, 209 Cal Rptr 456,
461 (1985).
169. Id at 462 n 5.
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considered presumptively met, subject to rebuttal from the company. 70 The
California Court of Appeal granted a nonsuit for failure to show causation. 7'
The court may have been unlikely to grant the plaintiff's theory because even her
own expert witnesses could not say that it was likely that her cancer was caused
by the drug and could only say that it might be possible."7 Also, the court
suggested that the plaintiff's sexual activity at an early age, with multiple
partners, and the presence of venereal warts contributed to the cancer. 73 A
court might accept the plaintiff's theory with either a stronger expert witness,
stronger scientific probabilities, or with a plaintiff that the court found sympathetic. Her legal theory is quite logical.
A rebuttable presumption that the defendant's lack of testing caused the
injury to the woman would allow the complaint to survive longer in the litigation process. The complaint would not be dismissed early for failure to state a
claim. The rebuttable presumption requires defendants to take the suit more
seriously. Even if the case is settled rather than tried in court, the defendant
pharmaceutical company will know that the reason it is paying damages is
because it failed to test on women when it should have.
b) Policy rationalefor shifting the burden. The Haft court stated that major
factors to consider in deciding whether to shift the burden of proof on the issue
of causation are the relative culpability of the parties and the burden facing the
plaintiffs in providing the information. 74 Relative culpability of the parties
includes the innocence of each as well as the ability to prevent the harm. The
burden facing the plaintiffs involves the resources available to discover the
information and their access to the information.
The first major factor in considering whether to shift the burden is the
relative culpability of the parties. The culpability of the injured plaintiff must be
determined in evaluating the relative culpability of the parties. In Sindell v
Abbott Laboratories,the California Supreme Court applied the theory that the
burden of proof of causation is placed upon tortious defendants in certain
circumstances. The court stated that the reasoning behind Summers may be
extended.' s

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id at 460.

174. Haft, 478 P2d at 476.

175.
[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury. Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at fault in failing to

provide evidence of causation, and although the absence of such evidence is not
attributable to the defendants either, their conduct in marketing a drug the effects
of which are delayed for many years played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof. From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able
to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product.
Sindell v Abbott Lab., 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P2d 924, 936 (1980)
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The relative culpability of the parties is even stronger in a failure to test drug
product liability suit. Although the plaintiff would be as innocent as the plaintiffs
in Sindell, the defendant manufacturer is more clearly culpable (assuming there
are no problems in proving specific causation). The defendant manufacturer is
required to adequately test under FDA regulations, and the manufacturer is
negligent if no tests on women are conducted in violation of the medical industry
standard described above.
The culpability of the defendant pharmaceutical corporation is also a factor
in evaluating the relative culpability of the parties. In a failure to test drug
liability case, the plaintiff's difficulty in showing causation is due to the lack of
medical research on how the drug behaves in women. This lack of medical research is due precisely to the alleged violation by the defendant. Clearly, the
failure to test on women greatly enhances the chances of an injury to a woman
who uses the drug. To require the woman to prove the causal medical link between the lack of testing and the injury would be to give pharmaceutical companies the message that they can avoid testing on women because there will be no
way for an injured woman to sue successfully.176 In a drug product liability
failure to test suit, the defendant manufacturer also exercises control over its
clinical trials, creates the dangerous condition, and profits from the manufacture
of the drug.
Determining which party is best able to prevent the harm is also important
in determining the relative culpability of the parties. Since the defendant drug
company is the one to decide whether or not to test women subjects, the defendant is in the best position to prevent the harm that occurs when a drug
injures a woman when that drug was never tested on women.
The Summers court described the policy behind shifting the burden of
proving causation to defendants and imposing alternative joint liability: "The
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to
Ordinarily defendants are in a far better
which defendant caused the harm ....
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury."" The
reason underlying the Summers rule is "the injustice of permitting proved
wrongdoers ... to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct
and the resulting harm has made it difficult to prove which of them has caused
the harm."' 78
The Haft court said that its facts presented "a stronger case for shifting the

176. For the same reasoning, see Haft, 478 P2d at 477.
If the pool owner can disregard the statute and retreat to the sanctuary of the
argument that the plaintiff must prove the 'cause' of the death which obviously is
unknown, he can, without liability, expose his paying patron to the very danger
that the statute would avoid. Since the pool owner violates the statute, since he
creates the dangerous condition and exercises control over it, since the death occurs
upon his premises with which he is familiar, since he profits from the presence of
the pool, he cannot take refuge in the position that the burden of proof rests with
the probable victim of his statutory violation.
177. Summers, 199 P2d at 4.

178. Restatement (Second) of Torts S 433B, Comment f (1965)
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burden of proof to defendants than Summers, because [the Haft defendants] are
in a sense more 'culpably' responsible... than were the [defendants] in Summers."' 79 In a failure to test drug product liability case, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer defendant is at least as culpable as the defendants in Summers and
Haft.

The second major factor in considering whether to shift the burden is the
burden facing the parties in providing the information. One way to determine the
difficulty in providing the information is to consider the resources available to
discover the information.
One tort law scholar has argued that the burden of proof on causation
should be shifted to the defendant in all drug tort cases because of the power
imbalance between the parties.8 0 She points out that in criminal cases the government, a large and powerful party, is against an individual and that the justice
system has therefore attempted to heavily weight presumptions in favor of the
individual defendant.' She argues by analogy that in drug tort cases there
should be presumptions in favor of the individual injured plaintiff over the large
manufacturing corporation."2
The justice system should not expect an injured individual to undertake the
kind of epidemiological or clinical research that is required to meet the heavy
burden of proving the element, necessary to any recovery, of causation. Drug
manufacturers will almost always be in a far better position to research the issue,
at least in the negative sense of proving that no or few adverse experience reports
attributing a similar problem to the drug have been submitted.
Another way to determine the difficulty in providing the information is to
consider the access to the information. To prove the element of causation a
plaintiff must present some evidence, on which an expert witness could base an
opinion, revealing the potential for a different reaction of the drug in women
generally or in some women. Although there is increasing scientific knowledge of
differences in the way men and women react to drugs, acquiring this information
with regard to a particular drug may be hard. Jean Hamilton, M.D., Director of
the Institute for Research on Women's Health in Washington D.C., has stated
that differences are not seen "unless we stumble upon them, and what we've
stumbled upon so far is the tip of the iceberg."' In other words, a drug may
very well cause adverse effects only in women, but there may be little evidence
of this if the manufacturer included no or few women in its studies. Therefore,
if the legal system is concerned with injury to innocent individuals, it should
place the burden (of producing conclusive scientific information on why women
did not need to be tested) on the defendant. If the defendants are not at fault,
they should have already made this determination and have records of their

179. Haft, 478 P2d at 476.
180. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L J 848, 869-71.
181. Id at 879-80.
182. Id at 880.
183. Extrapolation at 1050 (cited in note 1).
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decision not to include women at all or in large numbers. Presenting this information should be a relatively easy burden for truly innocent defendant manufacturers.
Similarly, in some recent employment discrimination cases, the Supreme
Court has decided that the burden of proof must shift to defendants on the issue
of causation.1 1 4 In Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterbouse
v Hopkins she argued that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer
"where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving
substantial weight to an impermissible criterion." 8 ' "Presumptions shifting the
burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities
and to conform with a party's superior access to the proof."'
The third major factor to consider in whether to shift the burden of proof on
causation is the foreseeability of the result of inadequate testing. The Sindell
court stated that the standard for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
is whether the absence of evidence of causation is a "direct and foreseeable
result" of the defendant's violation.'87 In the failure to test drug product liability suit, the absence of evidence of the causal link between not testing on women
and the injury to a woman is the direct and foreseeable result of not testing on
women and providing the corresponding test results. "The manufacturer is in the
best position to discover and guard against defects in its products and to warn
of harmful effects; thus, holding it liable for defects and failure to warn of
harmful effects will provide an incentive to product safety. These considerations
are particularly significant where medication is involved, for the consumer is
virtually helpless to protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleterious drugs."' 88
IV. Litigation as a Behavioral Modifier
Litigation has effectively modified the behavior of an industry in the past,
and will be effective in modifying the pharmaceutical industry's testing procedures. Another reason for promoting litigation is that nothing else has worked.
Recent scientific evidence and governmental policies have been ineffective in encouraging manufacturers to change their testing procedures.
As of 1991, many drug companies believed that the FDA explicitly required
that women not be included in clinical trials. 89 In November 1993 the FDA

184. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v Atonio, 490 US 642, 658 (1989); Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 246-47 (1989).
185. Hopkins, 490 US at 261-62 (O'Connor concurring).
186. Id at 273 citing Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 359 n 45 (1977).
187. Sindell, 607 P2d at 930 n 14 citing Haft v Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P2d 465
(1970).
188. Sindell, 607 P2d at 936 (citations omitted).
189. The PMA's survey, released in December of 1991, indicated that more than half
of the 33 companies responding to the survey say the "FDA has requested inclusion of
women in trials, while 35% say the FDA had told them to exclude women, often in
phase 1 and phase 2 trials, and usually because the women are of childbearing age." Cot-
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published a new guideline, which emphasizes that "substantial representation of
both sexes is expected in studies of safety and effectiveness, and the data should
be examined for sex differences in the effectiveness, adverse-event rates, and dose
response of drugs. If these analyses suggest differences between the sexes, or if
the presence of such differences could be especially important, as in the case of
drugs with a low therapeutic index, additional formal studies may be need19 0
ed."
Will this new guideline affect the practices of the pharmaceutical industry?
It is hard to be anything but pessimistic given the response to past nonbinding
guidelines issued by the FDA.' 9' Indeed, the FDA has stated that it doubts its
own guideline will have much effect."
To ensure that it legally need not meet the FDA's expectations, the PMA, in
its comments on the new guideline, emphasized that the guideline was not a
mandate and that discretion for whether to include women is actually up to the
researcher." So, while the FDA guideline and notice have nicely summarized
the state of scientific knowledge and have stated a system that is reasonable with
regard to including fertile women in clinical trials, the PMA is unlikely to follow
the guideline's recommendations.
The PMA!s comments on the guideline also demonstrate that its members
intend to exclude fertile women. Instead, they plan to actively recruit postmenopausal and surgically sterilized women to fulfill political pressures to include
female subjects in trials." These comments suggest that the drug companies
prefer a state of inertia to improvement. Although it is definitely better to include
post-menopausal and surgically sterilized women than no women, it is best to
include women with hormones that are more representative of most women,
particularly where one of the major differences in men's and women's responses
to drugs has been based on women's menstrual cycle. The PMA's comments on
a specific section of the new FDA guideline are a further example of its continued feigned ignorance of scientific knowledge of women's and men's different

ton, 267 JAMA at 470 (cited in note 43).
190. Merkatz, 329 New Eng J Med at 294 (cited in note 1) (citations omitted).
191. For example, in 1988 the FDA "specifically called for studies of whether safety
and effectiveness were similar within population subgroups defined by such characteristics
as sex, age, and race. Recent evaluations have shown that the requested analyses were not
being carried out regularly." Id. FDA representatives have announced that, "[i]n light of
these findings, the FDA will review all new drug applications shortly after submission to
ensure that they include appropriate analyses by sex. If such analyses are lacking, the FDA
will call for their submission and may consider refusing to initiate review of the application if sex-specific analyses are not provided within a reasonable period." Id (citations
omitted).
192. 58 Fed Reg at 39408 (cited in note 1) ("The agency recognizes that this change
in FDA's policy will not, by itself, cause drug companies or IR's to alter restrictions they

might impose on the participation of women of childbearing potential."). See also id at
39409
rights,
193.
194.

("This guideline does not bind the agency, and it does not create or confer any
privileges, or benefits for or on any person.").
PMA Response at 1-2 (cited in note 38).
See notes 4546 and accompanying text.
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reactions to drugs. 95 Thus, while the PMA appears to be fighting hard to stay
put, the FDA is "confident that the interplay of ethical, social, medical, legal and
political forces will allow greater participation of women in the early stages of
1 96
clinical trials."
What are these ethical, social, medical, legal, and political forces, and will
they lead to change? For one, women are moving into the upper levels of
academic medicine. 97 "If women are the teachers of the next generation of
doctors and the senior investigators in the next generation of clinical research,
women's health will finally get the attention it deserves without the need for
special rules." 98
Although National Institutes of Health ("NIH") funding does not directly
impact a pharmaceutical company's research, a change in NIH research policies
could affect medical research standards. President Clinton signed into law in June
1993 the NIH Revitalization Act, which included a provision that the NIH
ensure that all federally funded clinical research include a valid analysis to
determine whether the intervention under study affects women or members of
minority groups differently from other subgroups.' 99 Section 429B of the Act

195. The relevant section of the FDA guideline states:
Three pharmacokinetic issues related specifically to women that should be considered
during drug development are: (1) The influence of menstrual status on the drug's
pharmacokinetics, including both comparisons of premenopausal and postmenopausal
patients and examination of within-cycle changes; (2) the influence of concomitant
supplementary estrogen treatment or systemic contraceptives (oral contraceptives,
long-acting progesterone) on the drug's pharmacokinetics; and (3) the influence of
the drug on the pharmacokinetics of oral contraceptives. Which of these influences
should be studied in a given case would depend on the drug's excretion, metabolism, and other pharmacokinetic properties, and on the steepness of the doseresponse curve.
58 Fed Reg at 39411 (cited in note 1). The PMA's response to this section stated, "Of
concern . ..is the emphasis given to the influence of menstrual status on drug pharmacokinetics. With no available evidence of changes in drug pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics over the menstrual cycle, and the influence of menstrual status on
disease states being poorly understood, there seems to be little justification for giving this
issue the same emphasis as other drug/hormone interactions during drug development."
PMA Response at 3 (cited in note 38). The PMA, however, needed to read only one
paragraph of the guideline further for the evidence it claimed it never heard of. The FDA
guideline states, "[h]ormonal status during the menstrual cycle may affect plasma volume
and the volume of distribution (and thus clearance) of drugs." 58 Fed Reg at 39411 (cited
in note 1). In addition, plenty of scientific evidence exists in medical journals that describe
how response to drugs or other therapeutic interventions varies across the menstrual cycle.
"For example, some studies suggest that survival is significantly shorter when breast cancer
surgery is performed between the third and 13th days of the menstrual cycle." Cotton,
267 JAMA at 470 (cited in note 43). Other studies demonstrate that there are menstrual
variations in a variety of neurochemical systems and in patterns of drug metabolism and
responsiveness. Hamilton and Parry, 38 J Am Med Women's Assn at 127-28 (cited in note
47).
196. 58 Fed Reg at 39408-09 (cited in note 1).
197. Angell, 329 New Eng J Med at 272 (cited in note 33).
198. Id.
199. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-43, 107
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provides that the director of NIH shall ensure that women and members of
minority groups are included as subjects in each research project.200 This requirement does not apply if their inclusion is inappropriate with respect to their
health, the purpose of the research, or other circumstances that the director of
NIH may designate. 20' This Act, however, is unlikely to have much effect since
the NIH has a history of evading policies in this area, and the last exception may
swallow the rule, depending on how "appropriate" is defined, who defines it,
and when they get around to defining it.202 Thus, despite the increasing scientific evidence and governmental policies, pharmaceutical companies continue to
exclude women.
A. LMGATION SUCCESS STORIES
Litigation has a successful track record in effecting change. A great deal of
literature, including reports by the American Law Institute and by RAND, on the
success of tort product liability suits demonstrates that litigation can be very
effective in "identifying important new injury problems that warrant social
concern" 2 3 in areas where there is little or no regulation. 2 Interestingly,
"many of the most visible and costly product liability episodes in
pharmaceuticals ... include various vaccines, contraceptives, and products to
prevent miscarriage and treat morning sickness."2 " Although the RAND Report does not indicate why these suits were particularly effective, many of them
involve women-specific drugs. There are two ways companies can respond to
potential product liability costs within the product development process: "altering the physical characteristics of products to make them safer than required for
FDA approval and testing them more thoroughly."2 6 If FDA regulations are
not strict, it is more likely that product liability will affect change in company
decision making and lead to design improvements or greater testing.20 7 As
discussed above, the new FDA regulation on testing is a recommendation and
not a mandatory guideline.
Another success story is that of a single vaccine for diphtheria, tetanus,
whooping cough, and polio.20 ' The four antigens in the vaccine had each been

Stat 122, codified at 42 USC 5 289a-2 (Supp 1993).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People at 95102 (cited in note 59).
203. American Law Institute, 1 Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Volume I
The Institutional Framework 251 (ALI, 1991).
204. Id. See also Steven Garber, Product Liability and the Economics of Pharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices 131 (RAND, 1993).
205. Id at 61.
206. Id at 128.
207. Id at 131.
208. See Tinnerbolm v Parke-Davis, 285 F Supp 432 (S D NY 1968).
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tested separately, but never tested combined." 9 The vaccine was marketed as
an efficient way to vaccinate against all four at once."' The pharmaceutical
manufacturer who developed, tested, and sold the vaccine never tested it under
market conditions."' An injured person sued and won, and vaccines have since

been tested under market conditions.212 Thus, in certain circumstances, litigation is likely to be more effective than regulation.2 1z
This Comment advocates the adoption of a presumption (either by state
legislatures or by state courts) that defendant manufacturers who did not test on
women are liable unless they can prove they did not need to test on women."1 4
This presumption, and its corresponding burden shift, will allow women who
bring these suits to be successful, and will thereby change the behavior of
pharmaceutical manufacturers who currently believe the likelihood of a successful suit is low. The RAND Report indicates that companies make decisions based
on the likelihood of various outcomes;2"' if companies know that shifting the
burden of proof is possible or likely, they may behave differently. The mere
threat of litigation may induce researchers to test their drugs on the same
population to whom they market their drugs.2" 6

209. Id at 446-47.
210. Id at 446.
211. Id.
212. See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability:
What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 Ky
L J 705 (1990).
213. "There is often a considerable lag between the creation of risks by enterprises, the
widespread recognition of such risks and the need to deal with them, and the adoption
of regulations to control them for the future. Considerable harm may occur in the
interim." American Law Institute, 2 Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Volume
II: Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change 85 (ALI, 1991). "Regulations may also
underestimate risks or means for controlling them, judgments that enterprises are often in
a better position to make. Liability addresses these shortcomings by giving firms incentives
to control risks before regulations are adopted to deal with them." Id. While regulations
tend to be uniform and ignore relevant differences in the activities of firms, "[tiort liability
can fine tune the legal controls on risky behavior." Id. "Regulatory agency 'failure' may
occur because of inadequate resources or on account of political and bureaucratic
pressures. A system of privately initiated tort remedies, administered through the decentralized, general purpose court system, can serve as a corrective for these
shortcomings." Id at 86. Tort liability also "provides a compensation function not
generally performed by regulation." Id.
214. It is extremely unlikely that Congress would pass an enactment requiring the inclusion of women when phase 1 studies necessitate their inclusion. Congress just passed
the NIH Revitalization Act in 1993 after over five years of lobbying. As described above,
the NIH Revitalization Act has no teeth. And, the current Congress is trying to cut back
on regulation. It is also extremely unlikely that Congress would pass an enactment
adopting the presumption this Comment recommends. More likely, Congress would view
such a rule as in the province of the states.
215. Garber, Pharmaceuticalsand Medical Devices at 75-76 (cited in note 204).
216. Merton, Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People at 112-113
(cited in note 59). Litigation is not the only potential solution. There are other ways to
effect the needed changes. For example, requiring sponsors to pay for the cost of transpor-
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B. A SHmFD BURDEN SuccEss STORY

In an effort to eliminate significant health risks posed by toxins created by
industry, a similar burden shift was adopted by the state of California in
1986-Proposition 65.2"7 Under Proposition 65, the plaintiff in such toxic tort

suits need not show injury resulting from non-compliance and need only show
that non-compliance took place. The burden then shifts to the defendant manu-

facturer to show that its practices are safe. The manufacturer must show that its
action results in "no significant risk" or "no observable effect."21 In contrast,
in typical environmental tort suits a plaintiff has to show that a substance caused
harm in order to succeed in stating a cause of action.219 In order for a defendant to satisfy its burden under Proposition 65, the company must carry out research to establish safe levels for the chemicals in question."
Proposition 65 motivates companies to find the safest way to use substances
in their products."M Commentators have found Proposition 65 to be very
successful.' Many manufacturers have quietly changed formulations rather
than risk liability actions.' Also, Proposition 65 has succeeded where federal
laws have failed. 4 One commentator stated that Proposition 65's secret is
simply that it shifts the burden to industry rather than to the innocent public.s Placing the knowledge burden on industry can convince it that research
on safety levels is in its own best interest." Proposition 65's changed structure
has created lower risks and increased public confidence. 7 Thus, the Proposition 65 experience has shown that if companies know that shifting the burden
of proof on causation is possible or likely, they may behave differently.

tation at night and for child care at -the testing site would make clinical trial participation
more realistic for women. Also, professional education of scientists, scholars and IRBs
would help eliminate any subconscious bias. Id at 113-116. Legislation might be helpful.
For example, the FDA guideline would have much more teeth if it were a regulation with
mandatory language. Another example is legislation requiring sponsors to inform male
subjects of the risks of conception.
217. The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Cal Health & Safety Code SS 25249.5-25249.13 (West Supp 1989). See also Kara Christenson, Interpreting

the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 6S, 40 Hastings L J 1031, 1057 (1989).
218.
219.
220.
221.

Christenson, 40 Hastings L J at 1057 (cited in note 217).
Id.
Id at 1058.
Id.

222. See Beth Gaston, Toxics and the Environment: Living With Proposition 6S, Cal J
115 (Feb 1990).
223. Id. See also Bracing for Big Green, Occupational Hazards 49, 50 (Aug 1990).

224. Lester B. Lave and David Roe, Turning the Tables on Toxics, Christian Sci Mon
18 (Mar 7, 1990).

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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V. Conclusion
Both women and society at large are substantially harmed by the practice of
excluding fertile women from early phases of clinical trials and of not including
sufficient numbers of women in later phases of testing, when it is biologically
plausible that women will be affected differently by the drug being studied. The
reasons pharmaceutical manufacturers have argued for not including women in
the past are mostly based on false assumptions and ignore scientific knowledge.
While there will be costs to manufacturers in changing their testing procedures,
in weighing researchers' rights with women's rights to safe and effective drugs,
and in weighing the high costs of research with equity in society, women and
equity should win.
As this Comment describes, however, equity does not mean including large
numbers of every subgroup of the population in every clinical trial. Phase 1
subjects must be demographically representative of the targeted market so that
they each can have a reasonable impact on the early study. Whether to include
large numbers of members of any of the subgroups in later phases should be
based on the results of the phase 1 study and on any other existing data, such as
animal studies, toxicology studies, and available scientific knowledge of the
substances in the drug and their effects in humans.
An injured female plaintiff bringing a failure to test product liability suit, or
threatening such a suit, may be the swiftest way to induce pharmaceutical
companies to include fertile women in clinical trials of new drugs, and especially
in early phases of clinical trials. Shifting the burden of production on the element
of causation to the defendant-with a presumption that the defendant failed to
study the effects of the drug in women-will facilitate an injured woman's ability
to bring one of these suits. 2 8 Shifted burdens have been successful in similar
situations. The legal justifications for shifting burdens and applying presumptions
are overwhelmingly met by the situation created when drug companies do not
adequately test their drugs on the very same people to whom they market and
sell their drugs. This Comment's proposed legal reform would force pharmaceutical companies from their state of inertia to move toward where they should be
legally, morally, and scientifically.

228. Note that a further example of the pharmaceutical manufacturers' misguided concerns is the difficulty in proving causation. The manufacturers fear a lawsuit brought by
an injured child born to a subject, but do not worry about a lawsuit brought by an
injured user of the drug; however, causation is more difficult to prove for a child alleging
an injury that was caused at least 21 years prior than for a subject alleging an injury that
was caused within a few years of the complaint.

